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Abstract：In year of 2009 US President Barack Obama began the Strategy of “Pivot to Asia’ and released his “rebalancing Asia policy” in order to enhance US influence toward Asia and maintained peace and stability in Asia. Under Obama’s perspective the US Department of Defense proclaimed concept of the “Air-See Battle operation” and deployed regional military presence regarding security of entire Asia-Pacific nations. Additionally, US administration also initiated a Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement to integrate Nations of Asia-Pacific region from the economic aspect. Obama’s trip to South-East Asia following his re-election showed his policy of priority “pivot to Asia” was more active and intensive compared with his first term. 

It is difficult to analyze the “US Asia pivot” from the realist or liberalist school of thought. However, if we apply Social Constructivism point of view, we can easily understand that the US administration has begun to formulate a collective identity with its allies in Asia-Pacific regions. That is, under Social Constructivist perspective, two different actors under social interactions will create different anarchical cultures, and the resulting different culture generates a different identity. International actors with dissimilar identities lead to a different interests and policies. In sum, Actors with certain social identity will conduct national interest and its following policy. 

The author believes that the US has begun to establish a diverse collective identity with Asia-Pacific Nations in order to counter-influence from China, because the most dangerous and potential enemy from US perspective is China. The author uses four indicators of collective identity to verify relationships between US and Asia-Pacific Nations, i.e. common fate, interdependence, homogeneity and self-constraint. And the most important factor impacting to accomplish US-Asia Nations’ collective identity will be dependent on the objectives and goals at the primary actor, President Obama.
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I. Preface

In September 2009 former US Secretary of defense Robert Gates has released a secret memorandum regarding “Air-Sea Battle”(ASB)Concept and in 2010 US Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR)​[1]​ officially accepted this Concept. Two core objectives of this QDR are: “First, to further rebalance the capabilities of America’s Armed Forces to prevail in today’s wars, while building the capabilities needed to deal with future threats. Second, to further reform the Department’s institutions and processes to better support the urgent needs of the war-fighter; buy weapons that are usable, affordable, and truly needed; and ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and responsibly.”​[2]​

Under such logical thinking the US Department of Defense (DoD) began to promote a new idea of battle field. Besides, in the late summer of 2011, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta signed the Air-Sea Battle operational concept into effect, and hence established the Air-Sea Battle Office at the Pentagon to help realize its core tenets.​[3]​ November 2011, three senior Pentagon officers briefed reporters on this secret program known as the Air Sea Battle Concept. The concept calls for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps to integrate forces and other capabilities to defeat “anti-access and area denial weapons”—high-technology arms that can prevent or deter the US military from operating in certain areas.​[4]​

Since then a lot of research papers have been published. Especially, after May 2010 US Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (CBSA) has published a series of Air-Sea Battle special articles and reports. In sum, core ideas of Air-Sea Battle is to conduct US military operation on Battle field level and the main opponents are China and Iran. Besides, the key aims of this Air-Sea Battle is to combine US Navy and Air Forces related to their censor system; strike capabilities, defense forces and logistic system together in order to provide a safer combat area and to deter rival’s capabilities of Anti-Access/Area Denial(A2/AD) for US power projection in West Pacific Hemisphere. In July 2010 US has began a series of drill with her Asia allied regarding theories and practices of Air-Sea Battle with the purpose of the will to win contemporary warfare and prepare for the next conflict. 

On February 28, 2012 US Admiral Robert F. Willard, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Before The Senate Armed Services Committee On U.S. Pacific Command Posture, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 28, 2012, pointed out that US President Barack Obama has ordered his national security team to highlighted the emergence of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a threat to entire Asia-Pacific region, and regarded this as the most important target and goals for the US Pacific Command.​[5]​
Although in 2011 US President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jingtao has agreed to established cooperative partnership relationship, including mutual, stable and reliable military to military relations. But compared with the other dimensions of US-China relations, Owing to this goal, military to military between China and the US has facing an obstacle regarding following factors:​[6]​First, from the difference of ideas, because Chinese side regarded strategic dialogue, but US administration intended to enhance comprehensive military interactions. Second, because of US arms sales to Taiwan, China want to cease military contact with the US. Third, From Chinese side does not trust US intention toward regional military deployment. If both side want to enhance further military relations, US must get rid of this uncertainty.​[7]​

In February 2012, President Barack Obama said during the visit of Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping that “we welcome China’s peaceful rise [and] we believe that a strong and prosperous China is one that can help bring stability and prosperity to the region and the world.”​[8]​ Since US President Obama is presiding over a shift in military doctrine whose central tenet is that will be China, so the main strategic security and military threat to the US for at least the next generation. In fact, PLA has began to challenge US national security interests and also impacted security environment around West Pacific Hemisphere including cyber spaces, aero-spaces and sea-lane of communication in Asia-Pacific region. Although PLA always argued that its build-up of military capabilities for the aims of self-protection, but it will and power projection against US A2/AD has been waged concern for the China’s neighboring countries.

In order to analyze Asia-Pacific security environment after US has released “rebalancing strategy to Asia”, the author sets up four hypothesis regarding US’s strategy and policy toward Asia-Pacific region: 

Hypothesis 1: Recently the Asia-Pacific security environment has faced competition of maintained status-quo and challenging the status-quo. The reason is that owing to the direction of the China’s military and economic rise unclear and challenging the US traditional security influence toward Asia-Pacific region.

Hypothesis 2: In order to contend with China’s rise the US Administration must apply rebalancing strategy and cooperate with its allies via bilateral or multilateral approaches to contend with China’s dominance particularly with military aspect on the Asia-Pacific region.

Hypothesis 3: From economic interdependence, security common fate, democracy homogeneity and self-restraint from decision-maker four factors points of view the US Administration construct Asia-Pacific collective security identity, and US President Obama plays an important role.

Hypothesis 4: Under US-China competition in Asia-Pacific and US established Asia-Pacific collective identity; Nations around Asia-Pacific pursued two different approaches not only maintain military connection with the US, but also enhance economic connection with China, i.e., pursued a policy of “separating economy from politics” on China and the US. So nation’s within the Asia Pacific region must create stronger military links at US while still making both military and economic concession to China where possible.

The author first like to analyze the concept of social constructivism according to Alexander Wendt point of view and to explain the contents of collective identity and four factors which impact the formulation of collective identity. The author will set up some indicators to verify collective identity. Second, it is very necessary to know the origins and development from US New strategy toward Asia-Pacific after Obama took power and the core ideas of this pivot to Asia. Third, it is also important to find out which factors impact Asia-Pacific security situation, including US-China competition, regional conflicts and democratization process in this region. Fourth, according to indicators of collective identity the author try to verify the strategic constellation in Asia-Pacific region and to identify that US has build up collective identity in Asia-Pacific region. Finally, in the conclusion the author will point out the implication from US rebalancing strategy toward Asia-Pacific and also make some observation regarding Taiwan’s strategy toward US pivot to Asia, i.e. What Taiwan should do?

II. The Concept of Constructivism and collective identity

As usual, when academic research on the Asia-pacific security most of them use traditional realist approach, that is, they emphasize China’s military development threats entire Asia security because of the PLA want to break through the first island chain and also impacts US strategic influences in Asia-Pacific region. After 2010 the US official released “Air-Sea Battle Operation” in order to contend PLA strategy of Anti-access/Area denial (A2/AD).

However, there is little consensus over how that order is currently evolving. From realist school the alliance politics is to answer this question. That is, the “hub-and-spoke” alliance structure (with the United States as a ‘hub’, and Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia as ‘spokes’) was a major characteristic of regional security politics in the Asia-Pacific region.​[9]​But China believes such an alliance network as offered to contain itself, and expressed that such a network is an out-of-date historical object from the Cold War. If these divergent views are left unresolved, the US alliance system could create  a mechanism for a new security dilemma and intensive geopolitical competition in the Asia-Paciﬁc region.​[10]​

Some scholars from liberalist point of view believe that owing to importance of economic interdependence the US apply a policy of enlargement to let China’s economic interest as part of global economic interests. For example Washington encourage Beijing joint into World Trade Organization (WTO) and take more responsibility to the World community, but also apply hedging strategy toward Beijing.

However, these two international relations theories can’t sufficient to explain what kind of relationship between the US and China regarding Asia-Pacific security. Because at the same time from economic perspective they are belong to a competitive situation, but from military aspect they plunge into antagonistic circumstance. For example, owing to global financial crisis originated from Wall street, Washington hope Beijing to play more constructive approach to improve world economy and some scholars describe this kind of US-China cooperation as a sign of G2, for example a bilateral discussion between the US and China. This kind of  ”G2” approach were raised at both the 2011 Security and Economic Dialogue and in recent meetings between Barack Obama and Xi Jing ping.​[11]​ In sum, social constructivist approach to provide different perspective to view US-China competition and build a framework to understand Asia-Pacific security circumstance.

According to traditional international relations theories, such as realist school mentioned every states followed rule of power and liberalist school believes that interest especially economic interests would let Nation-states follow rule of interdependence, i.e. under power and interest we can clear under states' behavior regarding international interaction among nation-states. 

After end of the Cold War began a new approach of international politics, on the one hand because the emergence of non-traditional security threats, such as climate change, food security, border disputes and water and energy supply security need all new approach to handle, the other side owing to globalization effects, all the nations jump into interdependence situation, i.e., because of free flow from service, human, capital and goods, and nation-states can not along as single actor in the international relations instead of non-governmental organization and individual also play an important role in world politics. 

Under such development of theories and practices from  social constructivism on behalf of Alexander Wendt reveals a third way of approach to analyze international situation and cross-border interaction. According to Wendt's concept and ideas of social constructivism that there are three different anarchic cultures in the international society, which are the Hobbesian anarchy, the Lockean anarchy and the Kantian anarchy, it all depend on nations' way of interaction.​[12]​And if nations interacted under the logic of Lockean anarchy they can create a collective identity in order to formulate an interest group to safeguard their special interest in the international society. 

That is, “the mark of a fully internalized culture is that actors identify with it, have made it, the generalized Other, part of their understanding of Self. This identification, this sense of being part of a group or “we”, is a social or collective identity.”​[13]​ In fact, the collective interests indicate that actors make the interests of the group an end in itself, which will on the contrary help them overcome the collective action troubles that overwhelmed egoists.​[14]​In other words, nations will help each other because they already create consciousness of security, so they will stick together to protect their own interests against the others.

Wendt examine four causal mechanisms or “master variables” that could explain why states in a Lockean world would engage in prosocial security policies and by this means urge collective identity arrangement. There are interdependence, common fate, homogeneity and self-restraint. The first three are active or proficient causes of collective identity and the last self-restraint is a permissive cause.​[15]​All four may be present in a given case, and the more that are present the more likely collective identity formation will occur. But all that is necessary for it to occur is one efficient cause combined with self-restraint. So Wendt highlight that self-restraint has deeper effects, enabling states to solve the primary problem of collective identity construction, that is, how to overcome the fear of being engulfed by the Other.​[16]​

First, international actors are independent when the outcome of an interaction for each depends on the choices of the others. For the purpose of formulation collective identity, interdependence must be objective, because if a collective identity exists actors will practice each other’s gains and losses es their own. In other word, “interpendence is a matter of degree, depending on the “dynamic density” of interactions in a context; higher desity implies greater interdependence.”​[17]​

Second, actors face a common fate when their individual survival, fitness, or welfare depends on what happens to the group as a whole. And this can be reason of collective identity if it is an objection condition, because a subjective awareness of being “in the same boat” is constitutive of collective identity. And not the same case with interdependence origins from the interaction of two parties, but common fate is made by a third party which defines the first two as a group.​[18]​ But Wendt points out that common fate is not a sufficient form for collective identity formation because as with interdependence, actors may fear utilization by others in the collective situation.​[19]​

Third, a final efficient cause of collective identity formation is homogeneity. That is, organizational actors can be alike in two related senses, in their corporate identities and their type identities, i.e. first sense refers to extent to which they are isomorphic with respect to basic institutional form, function, and causal powers. The second sense of homogeneity regarding to  type variation within a given corporate identity. In the case of states the difference is in how their political system is organized internally, in their regime type.​[20]​ 

Finally, with these three active variables increase actors to engage in pro-social behavior, which abolish egoistic restrictions of the Self and widens them to embrace the Other. This course of action can only work, if actors can conquer their fears of being engulfed, physically or psychically.​[21]​As usual the traditional resolution to the dilemma of trust is external constraint by a third party. In domestic politics this exists  in the coercive power of the state. But in international politics Great Powers may sometimes play a role for weak nations, but hierarchy is not an alternative in general.​[22]​ So Wendt supposes that self-restraint is the decisive basis for collective identity and friendship that the latter are fixed basically not in acts of cooperation, but in with regard to each other’s difference.​[23]​

But how can states know that other nations will be self-limiting regarding their policy, according to Wendt’s question is : “how do states acquire this knowledge?” There exists three answers: First, through repeated conformity states slowly but surely internalize the institution of the pluralistic security community to the third degree.​[24]​ The second pathway is via domestic politics and the most well-established case being democracy. Because that democratic states are strongly leaning by their internal constitutional structure to bound the instruments they use in their disputes with each other to peaceful means.​[25]​ 

And the third pathway to self-restraint may work where the others fails: self-binding. It means that self-binding tries to reduce Alters’ anxiety about Ego’s intentions through unilateral initiatives, with no anticipation of specific reciprocity. For instance, one could unilateral give up certain technologies, or withdraw from occupied lands, or institute domestic constitutional constraints on the use of force abroad, or change one’s foreign policy to the collective.​[26]​

In fact, self-restraint is not an active cause of collective identity because it says nothing about the willingness to help others. But self-restraint generates collective identity only in conjunction with the other factors in the representation, but its role in that combination is essential.​[27]​



Figure 1: Content of collective identity

In order to verify the US’s rebalancing to Asia and its implication toward Asia-Pacific security environment the author try to explain each variable regarding collective identity and to set up some indicators to describe different contents of collective identity. For factor of interdependence, the author uses such economic exchange, foreign direct investment; International cooperation or foreign aid, etc.; to explain meaning of interdependence. For factor of common fate, the author uses such military security threats, non-traditional security threats, Weapon of mass destruction threats; etc. to explain meaning of common fate. For factor of homogeneity, the author uses such democratic system, respect human rights, good governance to explain meaning of interdependence. For factor of self-restraint, the author uses such as to accept international norms; give up WMD, peaceful solution to sovereign claims, foreign policy to the collective to explain meaning of interdependence.

Table 1: Indicators of Collective identity
variable	contents	indicator
interdependence	a collective identity exists actors will experience each other’s gains and losses es their own,	1.Economic exchange; 2.foreign direct investment;3.International cooperation;Foreign aid, etc.;
Common fate 	actors face a common fate when their individual survival, fitness, or welfare depends on what happens to the group as a whole	1.Military security threats; 2.non-traditional security threats;3.Weapon of mass destruction threats;
homogenity	Organizational actors can be alike in two relevant senses, in their corporate identities and their type identities.	1.Democratic system; 2.Respect human rights;3.Good governance;
Self-constraint	self-restraint is the ultimate basis for collective identity and friendship, that the latter are rooted fundamentally not in acts of cooperation, though these too are essential, but in respecting each other’s difference.	1.Accept international norms;2.Give up WMD3.peaceful solution to sovereign claims 4. foreign policy to the collective;
Source: Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, op. cit., pp.343-363.


III. Genesis of US rebalancing strategy toward Asia-Pacific region 

On January 24, 2012, President Obama outlined a comprehensive list of his priorities for the coming year in his State of the Union Address (SOTU).​[28]​ Obama gave new direction for defense spending. He mentioned early in the speech his past military accomplishments -- killing Osama bin Laden, and ending the Iraq War. He went on to propose $500 billion in cuts, while increasing the ability to defend against cyber-threats.

The US administration has released concept of  ‘pivot to Asia’, and in 2010 the US used tensions in the South China Sea and on the Korean Peninsula to increase its diplomatic and military engagement in the region. After those issues, Obama government has continued to enhance closer links with Vietnam and the Philippines; emphasized the future permanent deployment of four littoral combat ships to Singapore; and started to base US marines on a semi-permanent basis in Darwin, Australia.​[29]​

According to Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, Air-Sea Battle will help the services better organize, train, and equip themselves to provide U.S. Combatant Commanders with the capabilities necessary to maintain operational access in sophisticated anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) environments. This will be of particular importance in the western Pacific Ocean, because Chinese PLA is building its own A2/AD capabilities in an effort to deny the U.S. entry in its near-seas.​[30]​

In response of Chinese PLA is building up its military capabilities,, the US must work to simultaneously sustain a level of credible deterrence in the region while reassuring allies, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and strategic partners like Singapore. Air-Sea Battle is now at the center of this effort.​[31]​

IV. Factors impact Asia-Pacific security environment

A. US-China competition in Asia-Pacific region

There are lots of factors which impact Asia-Pacific security environment, but the author believes that China’s rise particularly its economic rise play the most important role. Due to rapidly economic growth not only in average yearly 8% growth, China in 2011 surpassed Japan as the second largest GDP in the world economy. Nowadays China has the largest foreign reserves and has trade deficit with the US every year over 100 billion USD.

The U.S. trade deficit with China may be much smaller than thought, according to new trade measurements that capture the flow of raw materials and intermediate goods as they work their way around the world into final products. One headline finding: The U.S. trade deficit with China would fall by as much as 25 percent when measured on a value-added basis — from $176 billion in 2009 to $131 billion.​[32]​

Additionally, because of China’s economic growth has increased its defense budget in 10 percentage yearly growth. Besides, China also has bolstered new advanced weaponry such as from navy dimension, the first Chinese indignity aircraft carrier in year of 2012 has been already set up for the PLA Navy and this step showed that China is entering into blue water navy. 

From air force dimension China has released the fifth advanced stealth jet-fighter J-20 and J-15 for the Aircraft carrier. From second artillery corps PLA has developed new type of DF-21 and multi-interdependent reentry vehicle type of DF-31, insofar China possessed long range capability to attack US homeland.

B. Regional traditional security threats in North-east Asia

After 2009 regional conflict regarding island sovereignty occurred not only in East China Sea but also South China’s sea and the other important issue belongs to North Korea nuclear test. First, diaoyutai islet in East China Sea from history point of view belongs to Taiwan, but after 1972 the US Government transferred administrative rights to Japan till nowadays. 2009 occurred China-Japan’s fisher boat dispute and in year of 2012 Tokyo Governor began to buy Diaoyutai island stimulated incident among China, Taiwan and Japan. 

So Japanese Government changed his policy toward island and began to nationalize Diaoyutai island stirred strong protest from China and Taipei. China began his forward presence toward this island not only announced territorial coordinates - base points and baselines - for waters off the islands and also carried out China’s de jure administration around Diaoyutai islet. Since then happened different disputes between Japan and China regarding law enforcement and sovereignty rights. 

From Taiwan side in September 2012 President Ma proposed “East China Sea Peace Initiative”. In light of the latest controversies in the East China Sea and the Diaoyutai islands, the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) reiterates that the Diaoyutai island  are an island group that belongs to Taiwan and are therefore an inherent part of the territory of the Republic of China.​[33]​

In the South China Seas the US Government persist freedom on the high sea and proclaimed its right regarding sea-lane of communication to this area. The US Government encourages all related countries to abandon military means instead of to negotiate with each other and initiated multilateral dimension to resolve conflicts. On the contrary China regarded from historical nine-dash U-curve territorial rights belongs to China and proposed bilateral approach to deal disputes with ASEAN countries surrounding the South China Sea.

For instance,  China coast guards protect their fisher boats and expel Philippine fisher boats around Huangyan Island because Beijing warned Manila not to "further harm bilateral relations" in response to Manila's repeated provocations, which have worsened the Huangyan Island impasse. But in public the US government support not only freedom on high sea also enhanced military ties with Philippine and Vietnam in response China’s assertive posture on South China Seas.

From 2009 end of six-part talks until now North Korea always played a “bad boy strategy” toward international community. Pyongyang kept on testing its long range missile, satellite and military exercise against South Korea. In December 2012, North Korea waged a missile test and South Korean tests carried out on fragments of a rocket fired in December in what the North describes as a satellite launch showed it would have had a range of more than 10,000km (6,200 miles), putting the US well within striking distance.​[34]​

Particularly, on February 12, 2013 North Korea launched the third times nuclear test that shocked the entire world because either US or China beware of Pyongyang can within short period prepare to this test. In fact, North Korea pursued so called “Military-first policy”. According to this “Military-first policy” North Korea believes that it will not be taken seriously until it can enter talks on this issue with sizeable military strength.​[35]​

C. Non-traditional security threats in Japan

In year of 2011 has been occurred three in one complex disaster in Japan that reminded world community to beware of the global warming cause climate change and also results a series of non-traditional security threats. After this severely damage to the life and property of Japanese people form international community begin to think about the reliability of nuclear power energy and start to change the power structure in the future. But for certain degree when international actor facing this kind of non-traditional security threats how to combine will and strength of the international organization is very important tasks because these issues are out of unilateral approach to handle and via multilateral dimensions could deal with those non-traditional security threats.

D. Democratizing process in Asia-Pacific region

Finally, there are lots of Nations which happened transfer leadership of their government. For example in January 2012, President Ma has taken second term presidency and took more openness policy toward China. In other words, President Ma followed his international security strategy: Some cross-strait specialists viewed this kind of pro China policy will impact balance of power among Taiwan Strait. And in Japan Abe was elected as Prime minister changed the relationship between China and Japan because of Abe took hard line regarding Diaoyutai island compared with his previous one. Abe has taken this dispute with China into international dimension and after he took the power flying to the US to search aid from the US government. From Russia side Putin was reelected as Russian President and began his more active international policies. 

From Asia strategic environment point of view the linkage between China and Russia will impact US dominance in Asia-Pacific region, since those  two countries have build up constructive strategic cooperation relationship. In South Korea also regime change began of 2013 and newly elected President Park Geun-hye  ,the main challenge for her to handle North Korea nuclear test. And South Korean and the U.S. troops began a 2-week intensive military drill on March 11,2013 testing various military operations as a chain of reactions against the Feb. 12 North Korean nuclear test, so President Park is set to visit its most powerful ally, the U.S.​[36]​

E. US released Air-Sea Battle operation in Asia-Pacific region

In general, the ‘pivot to Asia’ has become a phrase often used to describe increased 
US engagement that has most captured the imagination of nations in Asia and in the US itself. In fact, Air-Sea Battle means how US forces should operate to ‘blind’ and ‘roll back’ the maritime area and access denial capabilities that China has developed over the last twenty years. But is still has Questions regarding the political credibility and financial feasibility of Air-Sea Battle, which strongly relies on submarines and a future new heavy bomber.​[37]​

From historically point of view, the Air-Land Battle concept developed for NATO’s Central Front fitted into an established and stable regional situation, and supported NATO strategy of containment through deterrence. Since NATO forces needed to prevent the Soviet General Staff from being able to brief the Politburo with a viable theory for conventional victory in Europe. So a credible Air-Land Battle capability enabled NATO to deter escalation in localized armed conflict with the Soviet Union in Europe.​[38]​

The close connection assumed by some between the AirSea Battle (ASB) concept and the Asia pivot was evident in 2011, when the program was still classified. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) sought to clarify and frame the discussion. According to van Tol, ASB is designed to allow U.S. forces to fight through the Chinese missile, air, mine and submarine threat to operate in the western Pacific. So the CSBA paper ensured that the Air-Sea Battle concept became the focal point of discussion for military strategy against China—and the US combat systems have to pursue such a strategy.​[39]​

In fact, Air-Sea Battle can only be used in a specific strategic context. Because the original CSBA paper suggested Air-Sea Battle was necessary to meet anti-access challenges from China and Iran. In Iran, the requirement to keep the energy flow through the Straits of Hormuz needs the US to destroy A2/AD capabilities form Iran side. In this case would be defeating the Iranian ability to interdict the flow of energy. Hence, the level of investment necessary to ensure U.S. forces can defeat Iran in the Straits of Hormuz is an order of magnitude less than the resources needed to apply Air-Sea Battle against China. In fact, Air-Sea Battle has played an important role in that region.​[40]​

US President Obama emphasized that Iran also threat for US Interest in the Middle East, he said: ”Let there be no doubt: America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no options off the table to achieve that goal. But a peaceful resolution of this issue is still possible, and far better. And if Iran changes course and meets its obligations, it can rejoin the community of nations.”​[41]​

Besides, Iran and one or two other states provide the impulsion for Air-Sea Battle doctrine, but China is surely the main goal. In some ways, the military complement to the “rebalancing” strategy of the Obama administration, which places greater foreign policy emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region.​[42]​Because US administration regards Western Pacific not only importance for its economic development, but also China’s rise presented much strategic threats for the US influences in this area.

Generally speaking, related to the Air-Sea Battle concept seeks to use new technologies to counter Chinese initiatives as well as similar efforts by Iran to challenge U.S. capabilities in the Persian Gulf. The purpose of the Air-Sea Battle emphasizes improved command-and-control, precision strike, advanced missile defenses, robotics, submarine operations, and the use of air and space domains.​[43]​

But some military research scholars have different ideas regarding efficiencies of Air-Sea Battle. According analysis from Hammes that Air-Sea Battle provides no theory of victory against China. It is just an operational concept that attacks the enemy mainland to defeat its A2/AD in order that U.S. forces can get close easy to attack. It is hard to imagine how a strike campaign can deter a continental-sized power such as China. Because it has not existed any historical record that shows a conventional strike campaign can do so.​[44]​ 

Bill Gertz has another opinion, he emphasized that the Air-Sea Battle Concept is the culmination of a strategy fight that began nearly twenty years ago inside the Pentagon and U.S. government about how to deal with a single potential strategic competitor: the People’s Republic of China.​[45]​Just like Air-land battle operation is aimed to counter Iraq because its land power and geostrategic situation point of view.

Again Michael E. O'Hanlon expressed that Air-Sea Battle Operations would be a much better and more strategically meaning for the doctrine. That would includes  planning for war, but also under peacetime presence missions, posturing for deterrence, exercising with US allies, positioning for crisis response and in case of a cooperation with China in some certain activities.​[46]​Hence, O'Hanlon has listed the Top 5 hurdles facing executors of the emerging operational concept.​[47]​

Since that Michael E. O'Hanlon urged that two more changes are important. First, Air-Sea Operations should not expect a pre-emptive or even early operation against targets on the Chinese mainland in the occasion of war. Besides, Air-Sea Operations needs to move beyond a severely Air Force and Navy concept. And one set of smart changes would involve asking the Marine Corps, with its naval affiliations and expeditionary traditions, to organize for possible defense of Navy and Air Force assets and installations in the broader Asia-Pacific region,​[48]​including East and South China’s seas.

V. Verification of Asia-Pacific security from collective identity

A. Economic interdependence

After proclaimed rebalancing strategy toward Asia-Pacific the US government began to strengthen his economic ties with Asia-Pacific region. Actually, before 2012 Washington has released an economic framework for all Nations around Pacific region, that is trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Free Trade Zone between China and ASEAN nations after 2012.

In March 11,2013 The United States, Australia and nine other Asia-Pacific countries meeting in Singapore try to add more impulsion to negotiations to liberalize a big portion of trans-Pacific trade and business. The Trans-Pacific Partnership economies already account for 30% of global output and 20% of the world's exports of goods and services. If Tokyo joins this TPP, it would give the bloc added robustness in both regional and international affairs. Since Japan is the world's third largest economy, after the United States and China.​[49]​

From Taiwan point of view the challenge concerns trade liberalization, including the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) initiated by Southeast Asian nations and China,, and a free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union.​[50]​ Executive Director of the NZ US Council Stephen Jacobi said that“not only is President Obama commencing his second term of office at time when the budget sequester risks derailing economic recovery, but the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations are entering what we hope will be their final phase.”​[51]​

B. Common fate in security aspect

According to Bill Gertz that the story of Air Sea Battle begins in the early 1990s, when U.S. intelligence agencies exposed information demonstrating that the Chinese military regarded the US as its main threat.​[52]​ The example of the former is Mark Stokes. In 1992, he served as an assistant air attaché posted to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and he toke a private, self-styled surveillance trip to military bases in southern China. He has found that Instead of just targeting Taiwan with a massive first strike, China’s missile forces were preparing for a probable strike on U.S. military forces in Japan and the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam. Mark Stokes’s discovery was relayed increasing and set a shift in how Defense thought regarding to China’s military capabilities. His finding to this change is all the more impressive when considering that Rear Admiral Eric McVadon, was the leading advocate of the benign-China school in the US DoD and supposed Beijing had an outdated military. ​[53]​

So the challenge from China, in fact, increasingly is as much for political and diplomatic influence as it is for military power. China search to make use of its growing arsenal of economic, political, and military tools to draw East Asian governments closer to it in terms of economic integration, political systems, and military cooperation.​[54]​

Besides, the strategic realities in East Asia are changing as the countries of North Asia and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) enjoy continued economic growth and improved military modernization. Because China epitomizes this growth and modernization, with its economy predicted to continue to grow at a significant rate such that by 2015 its share of global output could be over 12%.​[55]​ So China’s assertiveness might be on an upward course as the military balance starts to angle in favor of Beijing. In such situation, the target must be on countering China’s anti-access and area denial strategy (A2/AD) not just its deployed military units. The Obama administration needs to balance conceding power with contesting power; and I fact, in the final analysis it might have to be sharing power.​[56]​

The emphasis on the US restructuring its military globally has been on the U.S. Army, but in the Pacific, key decisions in the near future also will focus on the Navy and the Air Force. The key objective will be to create the best mix up of U.S. forces in South Korea, Japan Proper, Okinawa, Guam, Singapore, Hawaii, and possibly other locations like Australia. The main goal will be to guarantee the greatest flexibility in the force to counter multiple threat and conflict contingencies.​[57]​

C. Homogeneity at democratic process

After Obama won the second term of his presidency it began his Asia trip and especially to Burma. Because of Burma’s landmark elections spring 2012 that marked a transition from military to quasi-civilian rule, Washington took a number of steps to ease existing sanctions against Burma in order to promote democracy and economic reform. The efforts to relieve the sanctions culminated with President Obama’s November 19, 2012 visit, which marked the first time a sitting U.S. president has visited Burma.​[58]​

Not only encourage a rising democratic nation such as Burma, also the US want to enhance relationship with a rising India regarding its national power and democratic system. In other word, US treats India as a key pillar of US strategy for the Asia-Pacific, Obama's National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon said that  Washington not just accepts, but fervently supports India's rise. Because "US and Indian interests powerfully converge in the Asia-Pacific, where India has much to give and much to gain," and  "Southeast Asia begins in Northeast India, and we welcome India's efforts to 'Look East,' from supporting reforms in Burma to trilateral cooperation with Japan to promoting maritime security".​[59]​

D. Self-constraint of key decision-maker

According to Obama’s  “State of Union 2013” he has described a strategy that will make the United States a magnet for jobs and manufacturing, through investments manufacturing, clean energy, infrastructure, and education.​[60]​ Because Obama believes that the world’s economic, political, and strategic center of gravity is shifting toward the Asia-Pacific. So Obama administration has therefore pursued a rebalancing of foreign, economic, and defense policy priorities toward the Asia-Pacific region and especially how to deal with a comprehensive growth by China in this region.  

National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon described this kind of rebalancing is working to “sustain a stable security environment and a regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic governance, and political freedom.”​[61]​ Additionally, not only challenge from China but also that order faces challenges ranging from cyber-security to North Korea to territorial disputes. And those rising Gains, including economic growth and the transition underway in Myanmar, must still be covered.​[62]​

In other words, Obama strongly believes that improvement domestic economic situation is upmost important goals for the next four years and how to adjust this national grand strategy engaging with complicated Asia-Pacific not only economically, but also strategically importance. Those tasks challenge Obama’s will and intention, so does China’s leader Xi Qing-ping for his first five years term for the Chairmanship of Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 

So under US rebalancing Asia definitely impacts China’s traditional influence region. How China reacts from US’s active security and economic policy and to formulate a collective identity in this Asia-Pacific region? It depends on how China will keep on his harmonious policy toward international community or after more years later when China’s enter into “moderately prosperous society” that Beijing will have power to set up international agenda and play much more influential global actor. Since then US-China competition in Asia-Pacific will become a dilemma for nations around this region.   

VI. Conclusion: Prospect and suggestion

According to analysis of US rebalancing strategy and its implication toward Asia-Pacific region the author believe that four hypotheses have been proved as follows:

1. From social constructivist point of view social interactive identity conduct interest, interest guide policy orientation, owing to successfully economic transformation in China, Beijing has earned an identity of strong power status, how to pursue its strategic interest is a very import task. According to US DoD “Annual Report of China’s military development” nowadays China has facing where to go: from its economic, military and diplomatic strength, and US has begun to view China as a potential strategic competitor within the next decade. In order to handle China’s challenge US government must   

2. In fact, with respect to this rising power the US has waged a comprehensive structure to contend future China, i.e., from military aspect, the US deployed “Air-Sea Battle Operation”, economically to build TPP, from foreign policy perspective US takes strong links with those countries which surrounding China. In sum, the US has playing a new strategy not only engagement, enlargement, but also containment and hedging strategy.

3. After 2009 took the power and re-elected in 2012 US president Obama regarded Asia-Pacific as core issues of foreign policy. That is, Obama enhanced relationship with ASEAN nations, promoted democratic process in this area and value of freedom and human rights. Additionally, Obama advocated idea of non-nuclear world in order to prevent the weapon of mass destruction and to build up a US leads collective security identity in Asia-Pacific region. The most important factor which impacts this formulation of a collective security identity is the will of US president Obama.  

4. Particularly, China has also created a regional economic identity in order to booster connection with Asia-Pacific region. On the other hand, China’s foreign and military policy let the other nations more concerned than before. It is because that China has increased its annual defense budget and developed supplicated and advanced technology and weaponry, but none knows China’s intention and will. So from this kind of PLA’s modernization and assertive foreign policy nations around this region have facing policy of confrontation, neutrality or bandwagon toward China, i.e., Asia-Pacific countries pursued a policy of “separating economy from politics” on China and the US.

B. The future development of Asia-Pacific security environment 

First, because of China's rise is not just a fact but also a continuing phenomenon in the Asia-Pacific region, so US administration regards just like previous strategic threats posed by Soviet Union after World War II and China becomes the future strategic competitor. The other reason is that China still under one party dominated and Beijing government would not follow the flow of democratization, to respect human rights and free media to the open society. For some certainty China is the future problems for the US. 

Second, since China's rise is unstoppable situation how to in advance handle this challenge might be the most important tasks for the US national security teams. So just like former President Clinton and Bush use engagement and enlargement strategy, in late Bush's administration used hedging strategy. After Obama toke the power the US must face this reality, i.e. the China's rise not only in economic, diplomatic dimensions, but the most important dimension is on the military modernization. Under such circumstance this Asia-Sea Battle operation from US DoD has its Chinese character.

Third, according to Wendt's collective identity approach, US leads Asia-Pacific nation to formulate an anti-China collective military identity in order to counter Chinese influence in this area, especially regarding the East China seas disputes and South China Seas territorial conflicts and its economic dominance in Western Pacific.

C. Impact and reaction from Taiwan

From Taiwan's perspective US pivot to Asia and deployed the Air-Sea Battle operation provide Taiwan's geo-strategic importance regarding this neo-containment and newly strategic development in the East Asia region. Since Taiwan and China shared same cultural identities and language, Taiwan could play as an important role of interface facing a rising China.

In sum, Taiwan must find its niche regarding US rebalancing toward Asia and from productive way to build some special collective identity with the US regarding Taiwan’s national security posture. So from security point of view, Taiwan must on the one hand enhance relations with China maintain peaceful exchange, but also think how to enter into US led Asia-Pacific security construction.
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